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Notes
JUPiSDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Defendant, a foreign insurance corporation not authorized
to do business in Louisiana, issued a policy in that state to a
public service company through a Louisiana broker. An action
on the policy was brought against defendant-appellant, Excess
Insurance Company, with two services of process made upon the
secretary of state, pursuant to statutes considered by plaintiff
to be in effect.' Held, jurisdiction could not be established by the
statutes invoked;2 neither could the claim be upheld that Excess
Company "was doing business, was present, had made such 'min-
imum contacts' or had 'established such continuing relationships'
in Louisiana as to subject it to the jurisdiction asserted here."
Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. v. Lejeune,
189 F. 2d 521 (5th Cir. 1951).
Under the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff,5 a state has juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant when (1) he has been
served personally within the state, (2) he has consented to juris-
diction, or (3) suit is commenced by attachment of his property
within the state. Jurisdiction over a foreign corporation may be
exercised when its activities within the state are such that "the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
1. The first service was made under La. Act 159 of 1940, now La. R.S.
(1950) 22:1253. The second service was made under La. Act 105 of 1898,
Art. 2, § 1, and La. Act 179 of 1918, § 1(c).
,2. Plaintiff-appellee, Lejeune, unsuccessfully contended that Act 159 of
1940, now La. R.S. (1950) 22:1253, subjected Excess Company to jurisdiction
by service of process upon the secretary of state, because the ambiguous
provisions of Act 159 of 1940 had been induced by the title, as held in White
v. Indiana Travelers Assur. Co., 22 So. 2d 137 (La. App. 1945), and the re-
enactment of that act in the Revised Statutes was accomplished without
re-enacting the title.
. In the White case the court held that it was obvious that the provisions
of the act were ambiguous and that the legislature intended to subject all
insurance companies issuing policies to residents of the state to service of
process, but it failed to accomplish such a purpose; "the act applies solely
to insurers who are transacting business in the state without authority."
(Italics supplied.) 22 So. 2d 137, 140.
However, the court was given jurisdiction under La. Act 105 of 1898,
but in the principal case the court held that that act was repealed by the
Insurance Code, La. Act 195 of 1948, and that no similar provisions have been
enacted.
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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fair play and substantial justice.' "4 There is no all-embracing
rule for determining what activities will be sufficient to subject
the foreign corporation to service of process, but the question
will depend upon the facts of the particular case.5 However, the
recent cases' seem to indicate a trend toward finding sufficient
basis for jurisdiction in activities which formerly would have
been deemed insufficient under the tests of due process of law.
Traditional theories" of doing business, presence, or implied con-
sent, as tests for subjecting the foreign corporation to jurisdic-
tion, are no longer emphasized.
This trend is apparent in the case of International Shoe Com-
pany v. Washington7 where agents of a foreign corporation, who
neither had the authority to make contracts of sale nor to receive
service of process, regularly solicited orders in the State of
Washington and sent them out of state to be accepted or rejected.
In granting jurisdiction to the State of Washington, the court
stated,, ". . . due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" In
Travelers Health Association v. Virginia,8 where a foreign insur-
ance company issued policies through the mail to residents of
Virginia, the court asserted that "prior decisions of this Court
have referred to the unwisdom, unfairness, and injustice of
permitting policyholders to seek redress only in some distant
state where the insurer is incorporated. The Due Process Clause
does not forbid a state to protect its citizens from such injustice."
The court recognized the states' jurisdiction over the foreign
corporations in these two cases, but in doing so, it did not rely
strictly on the theories of "doing business," "presence," or "im-
plied consent." Instead, the "nature" and the "consequences" of
these activities were stressed. It thus seems that the court has
4. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945).
5. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Hamilton, 26 So. 207, 210 (Ala. App. 1946); St.
Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 227 (1913).
6. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 84 (2 ed. 1937); Cull, Constitutional
Problems Arising from Service of Process on Foreign Corporations, 19 Minn.
L. Rev. 375 ,(1935); Comment, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 633 (1926).
7. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also Notes, 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 726
(1946), 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 523 (1949).
8. 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950). See also Notes, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 482 (1951), 36
Va. L. Rev. 795 (1950).
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developed new criteria for determining jurisdiction in an in per-
sonam action against foreign corporations. Certain minimum
contacts are necessary, but what these are depends largely upon
whether subjecting the foreign corporation to state jurisdiction
complies with the court's estimate of "fair play and substantial
justice."
In the principal case, the foreign insurance corporation issued
but a single policy to a resident of Louisiana. It has been held
that a single isolated act does not constitute "doing business" so
as to give a state jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.9 Clearly,
it would not be fair and just in every case to subject a foreign cor-
poration to local jurisdiction for an isolated transaction. For
example, the sale of one automobile or a single pair of shoes
would not satisfy the due process requirement of "minimum con-
tacts" and "continuing relations" necessary to establish juris-
diction. On the other hand, an insurance transaction is continu-
ous in nature because it extends over a length of time and
involves the periodic payment of premiums. Insurance transac-
tions may be perfected through the mail with relative ease, and
a single policy may extend protection to thousands of people.
Thus, the insurance business may be distinguished from other
types of activities, and perhaps the negative determination of a
"single transaction" should not always control the question of
jurisdiction.
In the principal case, the single insurance policy issued by
the Excess Company was of such a nature that it merits special
notice. The policy had a coverage of $250,000; the purpose of
this policy was to protect thousands of people coming in contact
with the public service company; premiums were paid upon the
policy in Louisiana to a broker, and by him transmitted to the
Excess Company. Because of these facts, it would seem that to
render Excess Company amenable to jurisdiction in Louisiana,
where the policy was negotiated, where the premiums were paid,
and where the cause of action arose, would not be contrary to
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Alfred Ray Ryder
9. Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U.S. 573 (1910); Rosenberg
Brothers & Co. v. Curtiss Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Frene v. Louisville
Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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